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NOTES AND COMMENTS
of the new Federal Rules, it is generally held that an amendment will
not state a new cause of action if the facts stated show ". . . substan-
tially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction.., although
the form of liability asserted or the alleged incidents of the transaction
may be different.132 By application of this principle to the case at
hand, the result reached by the court seems unavoidable. The plaintiff
sought no relief against the partnership in his original complaint, but
both the original and amended complaints were directed against the
conduct of the individual defendant.
JAmEs G. HUDsoN, JR.
White Slave Traffic Act-Intent and Purpose within
the Meaning of the Act
Defendants operated a house of prostitution in Nebraska. They
took a vacation trip to Utah, carrying two prostitutes employed in their
house. It was undisputed that the trip was planned as a vacation, the
respective parties bearing individual expenses. Upon their return with
the defendants, the girls re-entered the defendants' employ. The United
States Supreme Court held that there was no violation of the "White
Slave Traffic Act" by the defendants, for they did not transport the
girls with the intent or purpose to facilitate prostitution within the
meaning of the Act. Furthermore, the fact that the girls resumed their
immoral practice did not operate to, inject a retroactive illegal purpose
into the trip.' This case raises the interesting question: What consti-
tutes "intent and purpose" within the meaning of the "White Slave
Traffic Act?"
The "Mann Act," most often called the "White Slave Traffic Act,"
provides that "Any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to
be transported. . . in interstate commerce. . . any woman or girl for
the purposes of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral
purpose, or with the intent and purpose to induce; entice; or compel
such woman or girl to become a prostitute or to give herself up to de-
bauchery, or engage in any other immoral practice ... shall be -deemed
guilty of a felony ... ."' Thus, it appears from the reading of the
statute that there are two requisites to a conviction: (1) knowingly
transporting in interstate commerce (2) for the purpose of prostitution,
debauchery, or any other immoral purpose.3 Under the statute there
is no distinction between "intent" and "purpose." If the transportation
12 Brown v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 F. Supp. 443 (D. N. J. 1940); accord,
White v. Holland Fur. Co., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 32 (S. D. Ohio, 1939).
1 Mortensen v. U. S., - U. S. - , 64 Sup. Ct. 1037, - L. ed.
(1944).2 36 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. §398 (1927).
'U. S. v. Lewis, 110 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. den.., 310 U. S.
634, 60 Sup. Ct. 1077, 84 L. ed. 1404 (1940); Shama v. U. S., 94 F. (2d) 1(C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
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was for the purpose of an unlawful intercourse, it must have been with
the intent to have unlawful intercourse or to engage in some immoral
purpose.4 The offense is complete the moment a woman or girl is
transported in interstate commerce with the requisite intent ;5 while
the immoral conduct and relations of the parties, consummation of
purpose,"* and immoral purpose7* of the woman transported are in
no sense parts of the offense.
The Act attempts to curb illicit relations in three fields:
(1) Prostitution. In a restricted sense, prostitution is the practice
of a female in offering her body to indiscriminate intercourse with men.8
(2) Debauchery. Under the statute "debauchery" is not limited to
the meaning of seduction, which would require proof that the defendant
procured the transportation in order that he might more surely and
readily induce the woman to yield to his wishes. Rather, the term in-
cludes a purpose to expose her to such influence as will naturally and
inevitably so corrupt her character as to lead her to acts of sexual
immorality.9
(3) Other Immoral Practices. This all-inclusive term was adopted
as an attempt to include any immoral relations not covered specifically
in prostitution and debauchery. Thus, there have been convictions
under this section of the statute where women were transported to
manage houses of prostitution, 1 participate in nude dances,11 entice
men to enter houses of prostitution,12* and to work in low-class dance
'Carey v. U. S., 265 Fed. 515 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920); U. S. v. Otero, 5 F.
Supp. 201 (W. D. Ky. 1933).
' Wilson v. U. S., 232 U. S. 563, 34 Sup. C1. 347, 58 L. ed. 728 (1913) ; Ellis
v. U. S., 138 F. (2d) 612 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943) ; Neff v. U. S., 105 F. (2d) 688
(C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
C*Wilson v. U. S., 232 U. S. 563, 34 Sup. Ct. 347, 58 L. ed. 728 (1913) (The
solicitor later refused to accept the services.) ; Malagna v. U. S., 57 F. (2d) 822
(C. C. A. 1st, 1932); U. S. v. Brand, 229 Fed. 847 (S. D. N. Y. 1916); U. S.
v. Long, 16 F. Supp. 231 (E. D. Ill. 1936) (Accused hired girls supposedly for
ticket agents, but later informed them that they were to participate in a "hootch
show." The girls rebelled.).
'*Hart v. U. S., 11 F. (2d) 499 (C. C. A. 9th, 1926), cert. den., 273 U. S.
694, 47 Sup. Ct. 92, 71 L. ed. 84 (1926) (The government does not have to prove
an immoral purpose on the -part of the woman transported in order to sustain a
conviction.).
'People v. Demouset, 71 Cal. 611, 613, 12 Pac. 788, 789 (1887); State v.
Godwin, 33 Kan. 538, 542, 6 Pac. 899, 901 (1885) ; State v. Brow, 64 N. H. 577,
579, 15 Atl. 216, 217 (1888) ; Carpenter v. People, 8 Barb. 603, 610 (N. Y. 1850).
' Van Pelt v. U. S. 240 Fed. 346, 348, L. R. A. 1917E, 1135, 1137 (C. C. A.
4th, 1917).
"°Simpson v. U. S., 157 C. C. A. 470, 245 Fed. 278 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917),
cert. den., 245 U. S. 667, 38 Sup. Ct. 133, 62 L. ed. 538 (1917).
' U. S. v. Lewis, 110 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940), cert. den., 310 U. S.
634, 60 Sup. Ct. 1077, 84 L. ed. 1403 (1940).
"*Beyer v. U. S., 163 C. C. A. 289, 251 Fed. 39 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (Ac-
cused hired girls as entertainers for a Mexican dance hall. The girls were under
contract not to act as prostitutes; but were instructed to state, if asked, that other
girls were available. The court held that although there was no debauchery
contemplated by the accused in transporting the girls, the purpose was ultimately
brought within the statute; the luring of men to a house of prostitution is as es-
sential as a manager would have been.),
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halls.lS* It appears that if a female is transported for the purpose of
having her engage in acts which tend to lead ultimately to that form of
debauchery or immoral conduct consisting of sexual acts, there is a
transportation for the "purpose of prostitution, debauchery, or other
immoral purpose"; and whether or not the accused intended to debauch
the girls is entirely immaterial.
Interstate transportation as denounced by the Act must have un-
lawful intent for its primary purpose, or be a means of effecting or
facilitating sexual relations in order to sustain a conviction.14 * There
must be convincing evidence of the intention to transport the woman
in question for immoral purposes, and such intent must be formed be-
fore the woman in question reached the state to which she was being
transported.ls*
If the sexual relations were not the purpose of the trip, but rather
were incidental thereto, there is no violation of the statute. The mere
fact that an immoral act was committed on an interstate trip does not
"'*Athanasaw v. U. S., 227 U. S. 326, 33 Sup. Ct. 285, 57 L. ed. 528 (1913)
(Accused employed an innocent country girl for the stage. It appeared that the
theatre was a place where the employees drank, cursed, and smoked excessively.
There was evidence of an intent on the part of the accused that he had engaged
the girl, possibly with an intent to debauch her later. The court held this em-
ployment to be an efficient "school of debauchery," leading to illicit intercourse
ultimately.).
14* Drossos v. U. S., 16 F. (2d) 833 (C. C. A. 8th, 1927) (Defendant trans-
ported a married woman and her child at the woman's request. Counsel for the
defendant requested the court to instruct the jury that if the defendant-who
appeared to be very ignorant-believed that he could marry the woman in another
state and intended to do so before he cohabited with her, the verdict should be
not guilty. Upon the refusal of the District Court to do so, the Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, saying that whether the defendant intended to defraud the
woman was a question of fact for the jury; and the defendant was not guilty if
he had no intentions of having sexual relations with the woman unless and until
he might lawfully marry her.) ; Corbett r. U. S., 299 Fed. 27 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924)
(Defendant paid for the transportation of a woman, with whom he was having
sexual relations, from one state to another, where she visited her children. Then
he paid the fare for her return trip. The Court held intent to be a jury ques-
tion.) ; Sloan v. U. S., 287 Fed. 91 (C. C. A. 8th, 1923) (Evidence showed that
the woman was transported for the purpose of securing employment. Intercourse
was had frequently before and after the trip.); Fisher v. U. S., 266 Fed. 667
(C. C. A. 4th, 1920) ; Welsh v. U. S., 136 C. C. A. 370, 220 Fed. 764 (C. C. A.
4th, 1915) (Accused delivered a message from the woman's aunt, requesting her
to return. The court held that, in order to sustain a conviction, it was essential
to show that the trip would not have been made unless such trip was made by the
woman at the instance of the accused; and the mere fact that the accused had
in mind the probability or expectation of again possessing the woman is immaterial,
if she made the trip for other reasons.).
*Alpert v. U. S., 12 F. (2d) 352 (C. C. A. 2d, 1926) ; Gillette v. U. S., 149
C. C. A. 405, 236 Fed. 215 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916) (State investigator invited a
prostitute from a house which he was investigating to dine with him in another
state. After the meal they became intoxicated, and sexual relations resulted. The
court held that the trip was not made with the intent and purpose of debauchery.) ;
U. S. v. Oriolo, 49 F. Supp. 226 (E. D. Pa. 1943) (Defendant informed a
woman whom he was transporting that she would have to resume prostitution.
This declaration occurred while the train was moving between New Jersey and
Pennsylvania. The court held the time when the defendant formed the intention
was a question for the jury.).
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of itself constitute the essential elements of the offense, for such act
may have been without forethought or anticipation at the time the jour-
ney was begun.1 6* In those cases where the accused freely had inter-
course with the woman transported prior to the trip, the courts are
inclined to treat such intercourse as incidental to the primary purpose
of the trip.' 7 But it should be noted that if one of the defendant's
purposes, among others, in transporting a woman in interstate com-
merce is to engage in illicit intercourse, it is sufficient to warrant a
conviction.lS*
Although a man can be convicted of transporting his wife for the
purposes covered by this Act,19 a bigamous marriage performed in a
state other than the "home" state of the parties-nothing else appear-
ing-will not constitute a violation. 20* However, if the parties cohabit
as man and wife after the bigamous marriage in another state, there
is an offense within the meaning of the statute.2 '
From the secrecy surrounding the crime committed, it is virtually
impossible to obtain direct evidence to prove intent. Therefore, intent,
purpose, or motive must rest ofttimes in inference.22 In determining
the existence of such intent and puepose on the part of the accused,
the jury is privileged to consider the conduct of the parties within a
reasonable time before and after the transportation, and such evidence
is not to be rejected because it might prove another crime against the
parties. 23* But the conduct must be sufficiently significant in character
and near in point of time to afford a presumption that the element
sought to be established existed at the time of the commission of the
1* U. S. v. Grace, 73 F. (2d) 294 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1934) (Girl accompanied
a bishop on a trip for the sole purpose of playing the piano.) ; Ghadiali v. U. S.,
17 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927). cert. den., 274 U. S. 747, 47 Sup. Ct. 6601
71 L. ed. 1328 (1927) (Employer transported his secretary on business.) ; Bigger-
staff v. U. S., 260 Fed. 926 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919) (Defendant accompanied a woman
on a journey, though not voluntarily, and during the journey had sexual rela-
tions.).
"7See Yoder v. U. S., 80 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 10th, 1935); Van Pelt v.
U. S., 153 C. C. A. 272, 240 Fed. 346, L. R. A. 1917E, 1135 (C. C. A. 4th, 1917).
"8* Carey v. U. S., 265 Fed. 515 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920) (Accused furnished
prosecutor with money to make an interstate trip to discuss her pregnancy and to
have illicit relations with her.).
" U. S. v. Mitchell, 138 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1943), cert. den., 321
U. S. 794, 64 Sup. Ct. 785, 88 L. ed. 699 (1943).
20. Gerbino v. U. S., 293 Fed. 754 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1923); U. S. v. Smith, 52 F.
Supp. 610 (E. D. Pa. 1943). In both of these cases the accused induced a girl
to enter interstate commerce for the purpose of marrying him. After the bigamous
marriage the "husband" and "wife" returned immediately to their respective
homes.21 fBurgess v. U. S., 54 App. D. C. 71, 294 Fed. 1002 (D. C., 1924).
22 U. S. v. Renegelli, 133 F. (2d) 595 (1943); U. S. v. Oriolo, 49 F. Supp.
226 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
23. Tedesco v. U. S., 118 F. (2d) 737 (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) (Introduced a
prostitute to show the defendant's knowledge as to the kind of place he was taking
the woman transported.) ; U. S. v. Oriolo, 49 F. Supp. 226 (E. D. Pa. 1943)(Woman worked for the defendant as a prostitute in one state. He paid her fare
into another. Evidence was admissible to show intent.).
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offense. The limit is largely within the discretion of the judge in each
particular case.2 4 Such evidence as the immaturity and inexperience
of the girls transported;25 the circumstances of employment, conditions
of contract, and supervision of the girls transported;26 prior illicit re-
lations of the parties ;27 letters;283 the diary of the accused's wife;29
character of the accused's wife and his attitude toward her;30 as well
as the fact that he entered her into a bawdy-house ;31 the fact that the
accused brought other women into the state for the purpose of prostitu-
tion ;32 and conversation dealing with the "attractive" life of a prosti-
tute has been held admissible to prove intent.33 Furthermore, even
though the woman transported vigorously denies that the accused in-
duced her to make the trip,3 4* or testifies that the idea of going into
another state originated with her and the accused was opposed to it,85
still it is for the jury to tetermine what was the purpose of the accused.
In the principal case the majority of the Supreme Court relied on
the case of Hansen v. Haft3 6 in holding insufficient intent was present
to sustain a conviction. In this case an alien woman, who was employed
as a domestic servant in California, made a trip to Europe with her
paramour to visit her parents. Upon her return to America with him,
she continued to have relations on the trip to California. During the
trip across the continent she was arrested and ordered to be deported
by the Secretary of Labor under an immigration statute providing for
deportation of alien prostitutes. The Supreme Court reversed the
order, saying that her paramount object in returning was to resume a
legitimate occupation, and that such illicit acts were incidental to the
trip.
The dissent in the principal case relied on the case of Lapina v.
Willian, ; 7 wherein the defendant, an alien prostitute, made a tem-
porary trip to Russia to visit her parents. Upon her return to America,
she represented that she was the wife of an American citizen in order
that she might gain admission. There was evidence that the primary
purpose of her return was to re-enter her profession, which she did
immediately upon her return. The court sustained a deportation order.
"See Neff v. U. S., 105 F. (2d) 688, 691 (C. C. A. 8Th, 1939).
"U. S. v. Lewis, 110 F. (2d) 460 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
Ghadiali v. U. S., 17 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
"Ammerman v. U. S., 262 Fed. 124 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
Shama v. U. S., 94 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
U. S. v. Mitchell, 138 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1943).80 Suslak v. U. S., 213 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914).
*t Cohen v. U. S., 120 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
"Kinser v. U. S., 146 C. C. A. 52, 231 Fed. 856 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
"Suslak v. U. S., 213 Fed. 913 (C. C. A. 9th, 1914).
"* U. S. v. Barton, 134 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1943) (It appeared that
the girl transported entertained "guests" when called for that purpose by the
accused, and later divided her earnings with the accused.).
:'U. S. v. Renigelli, 133 F. (2d) 595 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943).
291 U. S. 559, 54 Sup. Ct. 494, 78 L. ed. 968 (1933).
"232 U. S. 78, 34 Sup. Ct. 196, 58 L. ed. 515 (1913).
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From an analysis of the cases, it appears that the principal case is
distinguishable from the Hansen case, supra, for in that case the de-
fendant intended to return to a legitintate occupation. In the Lapina
case, supra, as in the principal case, there was an intent to return to
an illegitimate occupation, and in this respect the cases are in point.
However, upon closer analysis, it appears that the principal case is
distinguishable from both cases relied upon by the court. Even though
the return trip was made to resume activities in an illegal profession,
still such return trip was a part of a larger planned journey, made with
no intent to facilitate the purposes of prostitution, debauchery, or other
immoral purposes. The primary objective of the entire trip was to
enjoy a vacation, and the return to the house of prostitution was merely
an incident thereto. It is submitted that the Supreme Court reached
the correct result.
CECIL J. HILL
Constitutional Law-Right of Women to Serve on Juries*
The defendant was convicted for violations of the Prohibition laws
by a jury consisting of ten men and two women. At the impaneling of
the jury in the trial court, the defendant objected to the two women on
the jury, but this objection was overruled. The defendant appealed on
the ground of disqualification because of sex; and, in a 5-2 decision, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina granted a new trial and ruled that
women were not eligible to serve on juries in this state.'
The majority based its decision on these points: (1) Constitutional
provisions regarding trial by jury2 * are to be construed according to
their meaning at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1868,
at which time a common law jury excluded women propter defectum
sexus.3 (2) Even prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the statute,4
* This topic has been discussed in many periodicals. The following formed
part of the bibliography for this note: Miller, The Woman Juror (1922) 2 ORE.
L. REV. 30; NotEs (1932) 12 B. V. L. REv. 122, (1925) 13 CALiF. L. REV. 155,
(1939) 18 CHii-KENT REV. 103, (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 134, (1925) 25 COL. L.
REv. 376, (1926) 11 CoRN. L. Q. 533, (1930) 18 GEo. L. J. 393, (1928) 22 ILL. L.
REV. 777, (1926) 21 IL.. L. REV. 292, (1927) 2 IND. L. J. 566, (1922) 7 IowA L.
BULL. 190, (1928) 32 LAW No'ms 124, (1923) 26 LAW NoTEs 224, (1921) 19
MicH. L. REV. 662, (1927) 12 Miro. L. REV. 81, (1921) 6 MiNN. L. R-v. 78,
(1921) 5 MINN. L. REv. 318, (1930) 74 SoL. J. 510, (1937) 12 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 172, (1927) 12 ST. Louis L. REv. 138, (1932) 6 TULANE L. Ray. 324, (1937)
71 U. S. L. REv. 75, (1921) 69 U. of PA. L. REy. 386, (1920) 68 U. of PA. L.
REv. 398, (1926) 12 VA. L. REV. 661, (1921) 8 VA. L. REV. 139, (1926) 35 YALE
L. J. 887, (1919) 28 YALE L. J. 515, (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 423.
' State v. Emery, 224 N. C. 581, 31 S. E. (2d) 858 (1944).
-* "No person shall be convicted of any crime but by the unanimous verdict of
a jury of good and lawful men in open court." N. C. CONST. Art. I, §13. "No
person ought to be . . . deprived of his . .. liberty or property, but by the law
of the land." N. C. CON T. Art. I, §17. "In all controversies at law respecting
property, the ancient mode of trial by jury . . . ought to remain sacred and in-
violate." N. C. CoNsr. Art. I, §19.
'3 BL. Comm. *352. 'N. C. GEN. STAr. (1943) §9-1.
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